














































1. My	 full	 name	 is	 Jack	 Alfred	Heinemann.	 I	 reside	 in	 Christchurch.	 I	 am	 a	
Professor	 in	 the	 School	 of	 Biological	 Sciences	 of	 the	 University	 of	
Canterbury,	specialising	in	the	field	of	molecular	genetics.	
2. I	 have	 a	 doctorate	 in	 Biology/Molecular	 Biology	 from	 the	 University	 of	
Oregon.	I	have	a	double	BSc	(with	honours)	in	Biochemistry	and	Molecular	
Biology	from	the	University	of	Wisconsin-Madison.	
3. I	 am	 the	 Director	 of	 the	 Centre	 for	 Integrated	 Research	 in	 Biosafety,	
University	of	Canterbury.	I	have	previously	held	academic	posts	at	GenØk-
Centre	 for	Biosafety	 in	Norway,	and	the	National	 Institute	of	Allergy	and	




Diversity	 Secretariat	 on	 the	 Ad	 Hoc	 Technical	 Expert	 Group	 (AHTEG)	 on	
Risk	Assessment	 and	Risk	Management.	 In	 2014	 I	was	part	of	 a	winning	
bid	 for	 an	 internationally	 contested	 contract	 to	 design	 and	 teach	 a	 risk	
assessment	 training	 course	 to	 the	 government	 of	 Swaziland.	 I	 have	
provided	 expert	 advice	 on	 horizontal	 gene	 transfer	 to	 the	 New	 Zealand	
Environmental	Risk	Management	Authority.	 I	 have	previously	held	other	
roles	 in	 other	 multinational	 scientific	 bodies,	 such	 as	 the	 author	
representative	 to	 the	 intergovernmental	 panel	 of	 the	 International	
Assessment	 of	 Agricultural	 Knowledge,	 Science	 and	 Technology	 for	
Development.	
5. I	have	also	advised	both	multinational	scientific	bodies,	such	as	the	United	
Nations	 Food	 and	Agriculture	Organisation,	 national	 bodies,	 such	 as	 the	
Swiss	National	Academies	of	Science1,	and	professional	organisations	such	
as	the	American	Academy	of	Microbiology.	I	was	chosen	by	the	Commerce	
Commission	 to	 provide	 advice	 on	 the	 marketing	 claim	 “GM	 free”	 as	
applied	 to	 chickens	 fed	 GM	 plant	 material. 2 	I	 was	 chosen	 after	 the	
Commission	 did	 due	 diligence	 to	 ensure	 independence	 of	 the	 expert	
advice	it	sought.	
6. I	 have	 133	published	 articles	 in	my	profession,	with	 71	peer-reviewed.	 I	
have	 spoken	 at	 over	 40	 international	 conferences,	 and	 have	 been	 a	
keynote	speaker	on	10	occasions.		
7. I	have	served	the	High	Court	of	New	Zealand	as	an	expert	witness.	I	have	
served	 as	 an	 expert	 witness	 for	 Auckland	 City	 Council	 as	 well	 as	
Whangarei	and	Far	North	District	Councils.		
8. I	 provided	 this	 statement	 of	 evidence	 as	 my	 expert	 opinion	 under	 a	









9. I	 confirm	 that	 I	 have	 read	 the	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 for	 Expert	 Witness	








uncertainty	 regarding	 the	 use	 and	 safety	 of	 GMOs,	 with	 particular	
attention	to	the	coastal	marine	area,	and	whether	GMOs	discharged	into	
the	 coastal	marine	 environment	 could	 adversely	 affect	 the	 environment	
and/or	result	in	significant	costs.	
11. I	have	also	been	asked	to	assess	whether	there	is	a	science-based	case	for	
including	 in	 the	 proposed	 Regional	 Plan	 for	 Northland	 provisions	 to	
address	the	uncertainty	(including	lack	of	scientific	consensus)	and/or	lack	
of	 information	 about	 the	 risks	 and	benefits	 from	outdoor	 use	 of	GMOs,	
including	long-term	(potentially	irreversible)	environmental	effects.		





when	 faced	 with	 uncertainty	 and/or	 insufficient	 reassurance	 that	 the	
activity	 will	 not	 result	 in	 harm	 to	 members	 of	 the	 public	 or	 the	
environment.	 I	will	 address	 these	matters	under	 the	 following	headings:	
risk	assessment	and	the	precautionary	approach	and	uncertainty	and	lack	
of	scientific	agreement.	
13. In	 my	 statement	 I	 will	 refer	 to	 the	 products	 of	 genetic	 modification	 as	
GMOs	 (or	 sometimes	 LMOs);	 these	 are	 the	 products	 of	 the	 process	 of	
genetic	engineering.	However,	I	quote	from	sources	that	occasionally	use	





“Earth	Summit”.	 It	 is	 a	 set	of	principles	defining	a	 state’s	 responsibilities	










was	 inspired	 by	 the	 global	 community’s	 growing	 commitment	 to	
sustainable	development	as	expressed	through	the	Rio	“Earth	Summit”.5	It	
entered	into	force	in	1993	and	as	of	March	2018	it	has	196	parties	bound	
by	 its	 obligations.	 In	 the	 preamble	 of	 the	 Convention	 it	 is	 noted	 that:	
“Where	 there	 is	 a	 threat	 of	 significant	 reduction	 or	 loss	 of	 biological	
diversity,	lack	of	full	scientific	certainty	should	not	be	used	as	a	reason	for	
postponing	measures	to	avoid	or	minimize	such	a	threat.”6	
16. Second	among	 its	three	primary	objectives	 is	 the	“sustainable	use	of	the	
components	of	biological	diversity.”7	In	other	words,	the	Convention	does	
not	 seek	 to	 create	museums	 of	 biological	 diversity,	 but	 ensure	 that	 the	
environment	 and	 agriculture	 is	 managed	 by	 sound	 ecological	 principles	
and	 economically	 sustainable	 communities	 that	 preserve	 biological	
diversity	through	its	use.	
17. The	 Cartagena	 Protocol8	to	 the	 Convention	 on	 Biological	 Diversity	 is	 an	
international	 biosafety agreement	 on	 the	 movement	 of	 products	 of	
modern	 biotechnology,	 including	 living	 modified	 organisms,	 across	
country	 borders.	 It	 entered	 into	 force	 on	 September	 2003	 and	 has	 171	
parties	as	of	March	2018.	The	precautionary	approach	to	risk	assessment	
is	described	in	Article	1.	“In	accordance	with	the	precautionary	approach	
contained	 in	 Principle	 15	 of	 the	 Rio	 Declaration	 on	 Environment	 and	
Development,	the	objective	of	this	Protocol	is	to	contribute	to	ensuring	an	
adequate	level	of	protection	in	the	field	of	the	safe	transfer,	handling	and	
use	 of	 living	 modified	 organisms	 resulting	 from	 modern	 biotechnology	
that	may	have	adverse	effects	on	the	conservation	and	sustainable	use	of	






















18. Additionally,	 in	 both	Article	 10.6	 and	11.8	 of	 the	 Protocol	 it	 states	 that:	









about	 scientific	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	 management	 of	 genetically	
modified	organisms	 (GMOs)	and	 the	difference	between	 risk	assessment	
and	decision-making.	
20. The	 risk	 assessment	 framework	 that	 I	 am	 most	 familiar	 with	 is	
precautionary,	 comparative	 and	 case-by-case.	 This	 is	 the	 prevailing	
international	framework	as	well.9	A	useful	description	of	this	framework	is	
provided	 in	 guidance	 developed	 to	 assist	 users	 of	 the	 aforementioned	
Cartagena	Protocol	on	Biosafety.10	
21. A	risk	assessment	informs	decision-making	but	decisions	can	be	based	on	
more	 than	 a	 risk	 assessment.	 According	 to	 the	 official	 guidance	 on	 the	
Protocol:	 “It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 risk	 assessor(s)	 are	 requested	 to	
recommend	 whether	 the	 risks	 are	 ‘acceptable’	 or	 not.	 However,	 the	
definition	of	‘acceptability’	may	not	be	part	of	a	risk	assessment	but	could	
be	 pre-established,	 for	 example,	 in	 thresholds	 included	 in	 government	
policies	 or	 in	 the	mandate	 given	 to	 the	 risk	 assessor.	 Likewise,	 the	 final	
decision	on	whether	to	approve	(with	or	without	conditions)	or	prohibit	the	
specific	use	of	the	LMO	is	taken	during	the	decision-making	process,	which	
may	 take	 into	 account,	 depending	 of	 the	 national	 regulatory	 framework	
and	among	other	 things,	government	policies,	public	opinion,	anticipated	
benefits,	 costs	 of	 the	 risk	 management	 measures	 and	 socio-economic	
considerations”	[emphasis	added].11	
22. The	purpose	of	case-by-case	risk	assessment	is	to	ensure	that	all	potential	
adverse	 effects	 that	 might	 be	 caused	 by	 a	 GMO	 are	 identified,	
characterised,	 eliminated,	 minimised	 or	 mitigated.	 Neither	 the	 Protocol	
nor	 a	 comparative	 risk	 assessment	 were	 designed	 to	 identify,	 verify	 or	













some	 to	 feel	 that	 benefits	 are	 understated.	 However,	 they	 are	 not.	
Benefits	 (supported	 by	 a	 proper	 benefit	 analysis	 and	 evidence)	 can	 be	
taken	into	consideration	during	decision-making.	
23. In	environmental	risk	assessment,	case-by-case	usually	refers	to	either	(or	
both)	 the	 GMO	 being	 evaluated	 and	 the	 likely	 potential	 receiving	
environment. 12 	Therefore,	 each	 GMO	 may	 be	 assessed	 in	 every	
environment	that	it	may	be	used	in,	rather	than	assume	a	risk	assessment	
of	 the	 same	GMO	 in	a	different	environment	would	be	 sufficient.	This	 is	
because	the	GMO	may	create	different	harms	 in	different	environments.	
For	example,	GM	maize	may	have	no	wild	relatives	that	could	be	affected	






25. Peak	 scientific	 bodies,	 societies	 and	 international	 regulatory	 bodies	 (see	
e.g.	paragraph	46)	affirm	the	value	for	ongoing	risk	assessment	of	GMOs.	




26. New	 Zealand	 is	 not	 alone	 in	 regulating	 GMOs.	 There	 is	 substantial	




through	 domestic	 legislation	 of	 member	 countries.	 These	 member	
countries	include	New	Zealand’s	trading	partners.	
27. Among	 the	 15	 legally	 binding	 instruments	 is	 the	 Cartagena	 Protocol	 on	
Biosafety,	which	I	introduced	in	paragraph	17.	It	provides	guidance	for	the	


















Protocol	 (European	 Union,	 China,	 and	 Japan).	 Moreover,	 New	 Zealand	
belongs	 to	 the	 Codex	 Alimentarius	17	-	 a	 joint	 body	 of	 the	World	 Health	
Organisation	and	the	United	Nations	Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation	–	
that	 issues	 science-based	 specialist	 risk	 assessment	 guidance	 on	 GM	






environment.	 The	 next	 issue	 that	 I	 wish	 to	 discuss	 is	 who	 should	 be	
involved	in	assessing	the	risk	of	GMOs.	
29. As	 mentioned	 in	 paragraph	 26,	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	
international	agreements	on	 the	 trade	of	GMOs	and	LMOs	and	products	
thereof.	National	legislation	is	aligned	to	these	agreements.	14	




release	 of	 GMOs.	 In	 addition,	 the	 various	 states	 of	 Australia	 have	
legislation	on	 the	 release	of	GMOs.	Among	 the	different	 states	 that	
have	 legislation,	 some	 have	 complete	 moratoria	 on	 GM	 plant	
cultivation,	 some	 exemptions	 for	 field	 trials,	 or	 prohibition	 of	 some	
types	of	GM	plants.	18	
b. In	 the	 European	 Union,	 member	 states	 are	 able	 to	 opt	 out	 of	
regulatory	approvals	for	the	release	of	GMOs	and	prohibit	release	in	




31. Such	 actions	 by	 local	 governments	 are	 consistent	 with	 international	
biosafety	 agreements	 binding	 central	 governments.	 The	 Cartagena	
Protocol	 on	 Biosafety	 says	 in	 Article	 2.4	 that	 “[n]othing	 in	 this	 Protocol	
shall	be	interpreted	as	restricting	the	right	of	a	Party	to	take	action	that	is	














32. The	 US	 National	 Academy	 of	 Sciences	 noted	 the	 large	 diversity	 of	
regulatory	solutions	when	it	said	that	it	“is	not	surprising	to	find	a	diversity	
of	regulatory	processes	for	products	of	genetic	engineering	because	they	








Indeed,	 conclusions	 about	 GE	 crops	 often	 depend	 on	 how	 stakeholders	








have	 issued	 opinions	 consistent	 with	 precaution.	 These	 include	 the	
Technical	 Expert	 Committee	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 India	 20 ,	 the	
International	 Assessment	 of	 Agricultural	 Knowledge,	 Science	 and	





400	 researchers	 from	 all	 over	 the	 world	 and	 was	 adopted	 by	 an	
intergovernmental	 panel	 convened	 by	 the	 United	 Nations. 23 	The	
conclusions	were	not	in	line	with	a	simple	single	scientific	perspective	on	
GMOs	as	the	following	quotes	illustrate.	
a. “The	 three	 most	 discussed	 issues	 on	 biotechnology	 in	 the	 IAASTD	
[concerned]:	
i. Lingering	 doubts	 about	 the	 adequacy	 of	 efficacy	 and	 safety	
testing,	or	regulatory	frameworks	for	testing	GMOs”;	
ii. “Suitability	of	GMOs	for	addressing	the	needs	of	most	farmers	
while	 not	 harming	 others,	 at	 least	 within	 some	 existing	 IPR	
[intellectual	property	rights]	and	liability	frameworks”;	
iii. “Ability	 of	 modern	 biotechnology	 to	 make	 significant	
contributions	 to	 the	 resilience	 of	 small	 and	 subsistence	
agricultural	systems.”	24		
b. “The	pool	of	evidence	of	the	sustainability	and	productivity	of	GMOs	
in	 different	 settings	 is	 relatively	 anecdotal,	 and	 the	 findings	 from	
different	 contexts	 are	 variable…allowing	 proponents	 and	 critics	 to	













Some	 regions	 report	 increases	 in	 some	 crops…and	 positive	 financial	
returns	have	been	reported	for	GM	cotton	in	studies	including	South	
Africa,	 Argentina,	 China,	 India	 and	Mexico…In	 contrast,	 the	 US	 and	
Argentina	 may	 have	 slight	 yield	 declines	 in	 soybeans,	 and	 also	 for	
maize	in	the	US…Studies	on	GMOs	have	also	shown	the	potential	for	
decreased	insecticide	use,	while	others	show	increasing	herbicide	use.	




animal	 feed	or	 to	produce	pharmaceuticals	 that	would	be	unsafe	as	
food,	might	threaten	human	health…Moreover,	the	larger	the	scale	of	
bio/nanotechnology	 or	 product	 distribution,	 the	 more	 challenging	
containment	of	harm	can	become.”	24	
d. “Thus,	whatever	 choices	are	made,	 the	 integration	of	biotechnology	
[including	GM]	must	be	within	an	enabling	environment	supported	by	
local	research…and	education	that	empower	local	communities.”	24	
e. “No	 regional	 long-term	 environmental	 and	 health	 monitoring	
programs	exist	 to	 date	 in	 the	 countries	with	 the	most	 concentrated	
GM	 crop	 production…Hence,	 long-term	 data	 on	 environmental	
implications	 of	GM	 crop	 production	 are	 at	 best	 deductive	 or	 simply	
missing	and	speculative.”	24	
36. Release	of	a	living	genetically	modified	organism	introduces	risks	that	are	
different	 from	 the	 release	 of	 chemicals.	 They	 reproduce,	 disperse,	 and	
evolve,	 thus	 pose	 safety	 problems	 considerably	 different	 from	 those	
posed	by	non-living	products.	Once	a	GMO	is	released,	 its	multiplication,	
dispersal,	 and	possible	 interbreeding	with	native	organisms	may	make	 it	
difficult	 if	 not	 impossible	 to	 retrieve	 or	 eliminate,	 or	 to	 cost-effectively	
alter	or	remediate	its	effects.	
37. Difficulties	in	containing	GMOs	and	possible	irreversibility	of	any	potential	
adverse	 effects	 are	 matters	 of	 concern	 to	 scientists,	 as	 the	 following	
quotes	illustrate.	
a. “Other	 potential	 environmental	 problems	 of	 transgenic	 crops…may	
stem,	 in	 part,	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 movement	 of	 unwanted	 crop	





that	 unwanted	 genes	 can	 increase	 their	 numbers	 could	 frustrate	
attempts	at	recall	or	containment”	[emphasis	added].	25		









an	 agrichemical.	 In	 fact,	 GEOs	 and	 agrichemicals	 are	 fundamentally	
different	-	chemicals	eventually	degrade	and	become	diluted	as	they	
spread,	whereas	transgenes	have	the	potential	to	persist	 indefinitely	
and	 to	 spread	 without	 dilution.	 Certainly,	 we	 should	 proceed	more	
cautiously	when	we	may	not	be	able	to	return	the	environment	to	its	
original	state”	[emphasis	added].	26	
38. There	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 information	 needed	 to	 adequately	 assess	 some	 risks,	





viruses,	 bacteria,	 plants,	 fungi	 and	 animals,	 and	 the	ways	 that	 they	
could	 potentially	 cause	 harm	 to	 human	 health	 or	 the	 environment	
would	be	different;	




d. they	 are	 made	 using	 methods	 that	 are	 not	 completely	 understood	
and	 thus	may	 not	 create	 fully	 predictable	 changes,	 or	 changes	 that	
are	easy	to	detect.	
e. The	 tools	 to	 make	 them	 are	 becoming	 more	 widely	 available	 and	
therefore	accessible	 to	more	actors,	 including	 lay	people	 “tinkering”	
in	 their	 garages.	 29 	This	 is	 unlike	 the	 tools	 used	 in	 chemical	 or	
radiation	mutagenesis	 and	 for	 the	 creation	of	 transgenic	 organisms.	

















40. The	 methods	 of	 creating	 GMOs,	 especially	 emerging	 methods,	 are	 not	
completely	 predictable	 at	 the	 biochemical	 level.	 For	 example,	 researchers	
attempting	 to	 understand	 the	 properties	 of	 a	 novel	 enzyme	 that	 degrades	
plastic,	 and	 could	 be	 of	 use	 in	 the	 coastal	 and	 marine	 environment	 for	
remediation	of	plastic	pollution,	unexpectedly	 created	variants	with	altered	
activities.	31	As	the	researchers	involved	said:	“What	actually	turned	out	was	
we	 improved	 the	enzyme,	which	was	 a	bit	 of	 a	 shock…It’s	 great	 and	a	 real	
finding.”	32	
41. Unpredictability	 can	 complicate	 anticipating	 and	 detecting	 unintended	
effects.	Prominent	groups	of	scientists	do	not	believe	that	there	are	adequate	
frameworks	 for	 risk	 assessment	 of	 some	 GM	 crops.	33	New	 frameworks	 of	
assessment	may	be	needed	in	such	cases.	
42. For	example,	 the	new	technique	of	genetically	engineering	crops	to	express	
small	 double-stranded	 ribonucleic	 acid	 (dsRNA)	 molecules	 to	 cause	 RNA	
interference	(RNAi)	 in	 insect	pests	to	kill	them	34	is	as	an	example	of	at	type	
of	 GMO	 where	 expert	 groups	 are	 uncertain	 that	 current	 risk	 assessment	
frameworks	are	adequate.	
43. Where	no	proper	framework	is	in	place,	data	that	could	lead	to	agreement	on	
the	 safety	 of	 such	 products	 may	 not	 be	 available.	 When	 there	 are	 entire	
classes	 of	 GMOs	 for	 which	 there	 is	 disagreement	 between	 scientists	 that	
adequate	 risk	 assessments	 can	 be	 done,	 then	 there	 can	 be	 no	 general	
certainty	about	human	health	and	environmental	safety	of	all	GMOs.	
a. This	 point	 was	 articulated	 by	 the	 Scientific	 Advisory	 Panel	 (SAP)	
convened	under	the	United	States	Federal	Insecticide,	Fungicide,	and	
Rodenticide	 Act	 (FIFRA).	35	The	 US	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	
“consulted	with	 the	SAP	on	scientific	 issues	 that	might	be	unique	 to	
RNAi	 and	 how	 they	 could	 fit	 under	 the	 existing	 risk	 assessment	






















testing	 frameworks	 for	 dsRNA	 PIPs	 [plant	 incorporated	 protectants]	
and	 exogenously	 applied	 dsRNA	 products.	 Uncertainties	 in	 the	
potential	modes	of	action	in	non-target	species,	potential	for	chronic	
and	sublethal	effects,	and	potential	unintended	consequences	 in	the	
various	 life	 stages	of	non-target	organisms	are	sufficient	 justification	
to	 question	 whether	 the	 current	 Agency	 framework	 for	 ecological	
effects	testing	is	applicable	to	dsRNA	PIPs”	[emphasis	added].		33	
b. The	US	National	Academy	of	Sciences	issued	a	similar	finding.	It	said:	
“More	 research	 is	 required	 to	 address	 the	 sustainability	 of,	 and	off-
target	effects	arising	from,	RNAi	approaches.”	14	
44. Entrenched	 positions	 are	 held	 by	 people	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 GMOs,	 including	
scientists.	 From	 the	 trenches,	 benefits	 or	 harms	 can	 be	 overstated	 and	
unequivocal,	uncertainty	understated,	and	contrary	views	dismissed.	Nature	
magazine	concluded	along	similar	 lines,	saying:	“Tidy	stories,	 in	favour	of	or	
against	 GM	 crops,	 will	 always	 miss	 the	 bigger	 picture,	 which	 is	 nuanced,	
equivocal	and	undeniably	messy.”	36	
45. Tidy	stories	about	consensus	have	become	normal	 in	 the	debate	on	GMOs.	
While	normal,	 they	are	not	nuanced	and	 they	 imply	a	 simplicity	 that	 is	not	
true	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 views	 held	 by	 the	 scientific	 community.	 For	
example:	
a. The	statement	by	the	board	of	directors	of	the	American	Association	
for	 the	 Advancement	 of	 Science	 (AAAS)	 affirming	 the	 safety	 of	 GM	
crops	 was	 openly	 challenged	 by	 some	 members	 who	 said	 that	 the	
statement	 “cannot	 be	 assumed	 to	 represent	 the	 view	 of	 AAAS	
members	as	a	whole.”	37	
b. The	 British	 Medical	 Association	 said:	 “A	 great	 deal	 of	 research,	 of	
varying	quality,	has	been	conducted	since	1999	in	the	arena	of	genetic	
modification	of	food.	However,	many	unanswered	questions	remain,	
particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 potential	 long-term	 impact	 of	 GM	
foods	 on	 human	 health	 and	 on	 the	 environment.	 The	 few	 robust	
studies	that	have	looked	for	health	effects	have	been	short-term	and	
specific.	 There	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 evidence-based	 research	 with	 regard	 to	
medium	and	long-term	effects	on	health	and	the	environment.	In	our	
view,	 the	potential	 for	 GM	 foods	 to	 cause	 harmful	 health	 effects	 is	
very	 small	 and	 many	 of	 the	 concerns	 expressed	 apply	 with	 equal	
vigour	 to	 conventionally	 derived	 foods.	 However,	 safety	 concerns	
cannot,	 as	 yet,	 be	dismissed	 completely	on	 the	basis	 of	 information	
currently	available.”	38	









conclusive	 evidence	 on	 environmental	 advantages	 or	 costs	 can	 be	
generalized	 from	 the	 use	 of	 GM	 crops.	 Consequences	 may	 vary	
significantly	 between	 different	 GM	 traits,	 crop	 types	 and	 different	





and	 speculation	 begin…Researchers,	 farmers,	 activists	 and	 GM	 seed	




&	 Planning,	 School	 of	 Arts	 and	 Sciences	 at	 Tufts	 University	 and	
adjunct	professor	in	the	Department	of	Public	Health	and	Community	
Medicine	at	the	Tufts	School	of	Medicine	said	that	one	“cannot	read	




informed	 scientific	 opinions	 about	 the	 safety	 of	 GMOs	 that	 are	 or	 may	 be	
released	 into	 the	 environment,	 the	 reversibility	 of	 potential	 adverse	 effects,	
the	potential	benefits	or	even	the	ability	to	assess	risks	of	some	kinds	of	GMOs.	
While	 there	 are	 scientists	who	have	 expressed	 opinions	 one	way	 or	 another	
about	 all	 sorts	of	 aspects	of	GMOs	 currently	 commercialised	and	 released	 in	





safety	 assessments	based	on	 the	Codex	Alimentarius	principles	 and,	
where	 appropriate,	 adequate	 post	 market	 monitoring,	 should	 form	
the	basis	for	ensuring	the	safety	of	GM	foods.”	42	
b. The	 US	 National	 Academy	 of	 Sciences	 said:	 “It	 is	 not	 possible	 to	

















47. The	 inclusion	 of	 the	 coastal	 marine	 area	 into	 the	 GMO	 provisions	 of	 the	
proposed	 Regional	 Plan	 for	 Northland	 is	 consistent	 with	 Article	 10e	 of	 the	
Convention	 on	 Biological	 Diversity	 which	 says:	 “Encourage	 cooperation	
between	 its	 governmental	 authorities	 and	 its	 private	 sector	 in	 developing	
methods	for	sustainable	use	of	biological	resources.”	7	
48. Presently,	 there	 are	 no	 living	 genetically	modified	 organisms	 that	 have	 been	
released	 into	 coastal	 marine	 environments.	 However,	 there	 are	 many	
organisms	 being	 discussed	 in	 the	 scientific	 literature.	 Here	 I	 will	 briefly	
introduce	four	such	organisms,	fish,	algae	(microalgae),	seaweed	(macroalgae)	
and	bacteria.	
49. GM	 salmon	 is	 intended	 as	 a	 farmed	 food	 product.	 The	 GM	 salmon	 was	
modified	to	accelerate	growth,	allowing	the	fish	to	reach	market	weight	much	
sooner.	 44 	There	 is	 disagreement	 among	 scientists	 about	 the	 potential	
ecological	harms	that	could	arise	from	release	of	these	fish,	or	any	species	of	
fish	 with	 the	 same	 altered	 trait.	 However,	 the	 conditions	 imposed	 upon	




50. GM	 algae	 is	 intended	 as	 a	 cultivated	 biofuel.	 14	 Algae	 have	 a	 high	 biomass	
productivity,	 and	 they	 accumulate	 compounds	 that	 make	 them	
interchangeable	with	existing	fuels.	GM	algae	are	being	developed	and	tested	
for	 this	 purpose.	46	Algae	 are	 also	 a	 food	 for	 oysters,	 a	 significant	 farmed	
product	 in	 Northland.	 47 	Worldwide,	 there	 have	 been	 developed	 yet	 no	





















and	animal	 feed	but	also	 for	use	 in	biofuels,	 fertilizers	and	cosmetics.	Global	
value	of	harvested	seaweed	is	US$6	billion.	48	It	is	a	traditional	food	source	for	
Māori.	49	The	 potential	 for	 macroalgae	 to	 reduce	 demand	 for	 fossil	 fuels	 is	
expected	 to	 increase	 interest	 in	wide-scale	 cultivation.	 For	 example,	 the	 “UK	
government	envisages	between	560	and	4700	km	sq	of	seaweed	 farms	 in	 its	
long-term	 energy	 planning.”	50	There	 are	 850	 types	 of	 seaweed	 in	 the	 New	
Zealand	 coastal	 marine	 area	 and	 three	 are	 already	 commercialised.	 47	 The	
techniques	of	genetic	engineering	are	being	applied	to	macroalgae	to	improve	
its	 characteristics	 for	 industrial	 use.	51	In	 addition,	 it	 is	 being	 discussed	 as	 a	
farmed	 carbon	 sink	 to	 mitigate	 New	 Zealand’s	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.	52	
Macroalgae	may	be	genetically	modified	to	improve	their	use	as	carbon	sinks.	
53	
52. A	desirable	 feature	 of	 seaweed	 farming	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 reliant	 on	 externally	
applied	 fertilizers	 because	 of	 excess	 nutrient	 flow	 from	 terrestrial	 farming	
systems.	 50	 Seaweed	 farms	 are	 a	 potential	 mitigation	 strategy	 for	 the	
environmental	harm	caused	by	excess	nutrient	flows.	Excess	nutrient	flow	is	a	
significant	 concern	 in	 New	 Zealand	 including	 Northland,	 making	 the	 use	 of	
farmed	 seaweed	 a	 potential	 industry	 and	 therefore	 too	 introducing	 the	
potential	to	use	GM	seaweed.		
53. GM	 bacteria	 are	 intended	 for	 bioremediation	 of	 plastic	 pollution.	 31	 Plastic	
pollution	is	presently	driving	large-scale	changes	in	New	Zealand,	ranging	from	
the	banning	of	microbeads	made	from	plastic	to	plastic	bags	in	grocery	stores.	
54	These	 changes	 illustrate	how	motivated	 the	public	 and	government	are	by	
the	 threats	 to	 the	environment	and	human	health	 that	plastic	pollution	may	
cause.	As	the	discussion	of	other	ecological	threats,	such	as	exotic	predators,	
has	 shown,	 when	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 the	 problem	 is	 high	 the	 discussion	
extends	 to	 technological	 solutions	 for	 the	 problem,	 including	 the	 use	 of	







































can	be	made	 into	GMOs	are	 still	micro-organisms,	 then	GM	micro-organisms	
could	be	contaminants.	An	example	from	paragraph	53	would	be	bacteria	that	
might	 be	 genetically	 modified	 for	 bioremediation	 of	 plastic	 pollution.	 Their	
presence	would	arguably	affect	the	biological	condition	of	the	water	especially	
if	they	were	modified	to	colonise	or	survive	under	conditions	or	in	places	that	
they	 previously	 did	 not.	 The	 bacteria	 might	 be	 intended	 to	 be	 used	 in	 the	





those	 products	 were	 normal	 constituents	 of	 the	 environment	 the	
concentration	of	 them	 could	 change	water	 chemistry.	 This	would	 generically	
apply	 to	 any	 GMO	 intended	 for	 remediation	 purposes	 even	 if	 they	 were	
introduced	to	remove	a	contaminant.	
57. Other	 kinds	 of	 GMOs	 intended	 for	 terrestrial	 applications	 could	 also	 be	
conducted	 into	 the	 coastal	 marine	 area.	 For	 example,	 during	 flooding	 or	
harvesting,	GM	trees	might	be	carried	by	rivers	into	the	sea.	While	presumably	
at	 this	 stage	 they	 would	 not	 be	 living	 modified	 organisms,	 depending	 on	
whether	 or	 not	 the	 chemistry	 of	 the	 GMOs	 was	 changed,	 they	 could	 alter	
water	chemistry.	
58. Any	 GMO	 that	 was	 created	 with	 a	 trait	 to	 grow,	 reproduce	 or	 live	 under	
biotic/abiotic	 conditions	 that	 previously	 precluded	 that	 in	 the	 relevant	 CMA	
could	cause	changes	to	at	least	the	biological	condition	of	the	water.	If	as	part	











strategy	 to	mitigate	 the	 risk	of	existing	GMOs	 relevant	 to	 the	coastal	marine	
environment.	 Containment	 may	 also	 fail	 and	 that	 potential	 should	 also	 be	
considered	 in	 a	 risk	 assessment.	 Where	 the	 risk	 of	 containment	 failure	 is	
considered	 too	 high,	 prohibition	 of	 the	 GMO	 may	 be	 the	 only	 effective	
mitigation	 strategy.	 Here	 I	 will	 review	 the	 history	 of	 containment	 failures	 in	




even	 in	countries	such	as	 the	United	States,	which	has	 the	 longest	history	of	
commercial	 release	of	GM	crops,	 identity	preservation	 systems	 regularly	 fail.	
Examples	of	where	damage	has	occurred	include—	
a. a	 genetically	 modified	 wheat	 (MON71800)	 grown	 only	 to	 field	 trial	
stage	and	then	discontinued	was	rediscovered	in	fields	in	the	US	state	




and	 grown	 in	 only	 a	 “limited	 number	 of	 field	 trials	 in	 the	 Pacific	
Northwest	 from	 1998	 to	 2001”	60	was	 found	 15	 years	 later	 in	 open	
fields	 in	 the	 US	 state	 of	 Washington.	61	As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	




c. a	 form	of	genetically	modified	 rice	 that	was	grown	on	 less	 than	one	


















disruptions	 and	 arguably	 reputational	 damage.	 Estimated	 costs	 to	
producers	were	up	to	US$1.2	billion.	63		
d. an	Australian	organic	 farmer	sued	his	neighbour	over	 loss	of	 income	
because	of	gene	flow	from	a	GM	crop.	64	The	organic	farmer	was	not	
awarded	damages	but	the	contamination	was	not	disputed.	
63. There	 are	many	more	 examples	 of	 gene	 flow.	65	Harm	 from	 it	 has	 not	 been	
studiously	calculated	according	to	the	United	States	General	Accounting	Office.	
66	The	 central	 conclusion	 of	 their	 recent	 report	 was	 that	 the	 United	 States	
Department	 of	 Agriculture	 has	 failed	 in	 its	 duties	 to	 measure	 the	 costs	 of	
admixture.	
64. Potential	 harm	 from	 gene	 flow	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 that	 caused	 by	 the	 seed	 or	
pollen	 leading	 to	 admixture	 with	 non-GM	 plants	 through	 breeding.	67	Even	
small	 amounts	 that	 may	 contaminate	 products	 during	 storage	 could	 cause	
trade	disruptions.	When	mixture	of	this	type	is	detected	in	food,	it	can	trigger	
two	 different	 outcomes,	 depending	 on	 the	 concentration.	 Above	 a	 certain	
threshold,	 the	 product	 may	 be	 rejected	 (e.g.	 if	 it	 exceeds	 certification	
standards	or	has	not	been	approved	for	use	in	the	receiving	country).	68	Below	
a	certain	concentration	(e.g.	0.9%	for	labelling	in	Europe)	it	may	be	allowed	for	



































65. Among	 the	 kinds	 of	 organisms	 specific	 to	 coastal	 marine	 areas	 that	 are	
presently	being	discussed	for	genetic	modification	are	algae.	For	some	species	
of	these	organisms,	gene	flow	is	considered	to	be	the	most	important	risk	for	
creating	 unintended	 environmental	 harm.	 “The	 mechanistic	 and	 genomic	
evidence	 for	 extensive	 [horizontal	 gene	 transfer]	 in	 cyanobacteria	 calls	 for	
extra	caution	with	GM	cyanobacteria	for	mass	culture.”	46	
Whangarei	and	Far	North	District	Council	Coastal	Marine	Area	GMO	Provisions		
66. The	 precautionary	 approach	 adopted	 by	 the	 proposed	 Whangarei	 and	 Far	
North	District	Council	GMO	provisions	appears	to	me	to	be	broadly	consistent	
with	 other	 internationally	 recognised	 frameworks	 for	 decision-making	 also	
informed	by	assessing	and	managing	the	risks	of	GMOs,	such	as	described	by	
the	 risk	 assessment	 guidance	 of	 the	 Cartagena	 Protocol	 on	 Biosafety.	70	The	
GMO	provisions	appear	 to	align	with	accepted	 risk	 assessment	and	decision-
making	frameworks,	by—	
a. identifying	 relevant	 protection	 goals	71	(e.g. the	 “the	 control	 of	 any	
actual	or	potential	effects	of	 the	use,	development,	or	protection	of	
land”,	 protection	 of	 “people,	 communities,	 tangata	 whenua,	 social	
and	cultural	wellbeing,	the	environment	and	the	economy”,	long	term	
reputation	 for	 vigilance	 against	 accidental	 or	 unintentional	 GMO	
cultivation;	and	biological	threats	to	biodiversity	or	industry).	
b. considering	 the	 GMO	 and	 the	 intended	 receiving	 environment	 and	
intended	use	(e.g.	medicine,	field	testing	and	release).		
67. In	 my	 view,	 the	 proposed	 management	 Option	 B	 in	 the	 Whangarei	 and	 Far	
North	 District	 Council	 section	 32	 analysis	 for	 inclusion	 into	 the	 proposed	
Regional	 Plan	 for	 Northland	 comprise	 a	 reasonable	 response	 to	 the	 scientific	
uncertainty	about	the	effects	from	outdoor	use	of	GMOs.	
a. A	precautionary	approach	to	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	of	
GMOs	 is	 appropriate	 and	 consistent	 with	 international	 frameworks	
including	 the	 Cartagena	 Protocol	 on	 Biosafey 72 	and	 Codex	
Alimentarius.	73	
b. Moreover,	the	proposed	option	2	objective	F.0.2.1	is	adaptive.	

















a	 field	 trial	 or	 viable	 GMO	 veterinary	 vaccine	 has	 an	 unacceptable	
level	 of	 risk	 that	 cannot	 be	 adequately	 mitigated	 or	 managed,	 the	
outcome	of	a	risk	assessment	may	be	to	recommend	of	the	rejection	
of	 a	 GMO	 field	 trial	 or	 GMO	 veterinary	 vaccine.	 Based	 on	 this	 and	
other	 matters	 that	 may	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 for	 decision-making,	
the	proposed	GMO	provisions	prohibit	the	outdoor	releases	of	GMOs	
that	 are	 not	 medical	 or	 veterinary	 applications.	 In	 my	 opinion,	 this	
determination	is	consistent	with	recognised	international	standards.	
d. I	believe	that	it	is	possible	in	theory	to	conduct	safe	field	trials	in	some	




in	 New	 Zealand	 and	 overseas	 have	 also	 failed	 to	 contain	 trialled	
GMOs.74	Given	the	high	level	of	certainty	the	community	requires	that	
gene	 flow	 from	 GMOs	 would	 not	 affect	 producers	 in	 the	 region,	
prohibition	 of	 the	 release	 of	 GMOs	 for	 the	 foreseeable	 future	 as	
provided	in	the	proposed	provisions	recommended	in	the	Whangarei	
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CURRENT POSITION Professor  
ADDRESS School of Biological Sciences 
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EMAIL ADDRESS jack.heinemann@canterbury.ac.nz 
TELEPHONE/FAX 64 03 364-2500 
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. and New Zealand 
EDUCATION  
1985-1989 Ph.D. in Biology/Molecular Biology 
 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA 
1980-1985 B.Sc(Honours) in Biochemistry 
 B.Sc(Honours) in Molecular Biology 
 University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
2007-present Professor, School of Biological Sciences, University 
of Canterbury 
2003-2007 Associate Professor 
1994-2002 Senior Lecturer 
 
2001-present Director, Centre for Integrated Research in Biosafety, 
University of Canterbury 
 Member, Biomathematics Research Centre (2001) 
University of Canterbury 
 
2001-2012 Adjunct Professor/Senior Fellow, GenØk-Centre for 
Biosafety, Tromsø, Norway 
  
1997-2000 Biochemistry Programme Coordinator 
 (managed 5 undergraduate courses, ~ 20 postgraduate (PhD 
and MSc) students and 10 academic and technical staff) 
 
1992-1994 Staff Fellow, National Institutes of Health, NIAID, 
 Laboratory of Microbial Structure and Function 
 
1989-1992 Intramural Research Training Award Fellow 
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 NIAID, NIH, Laboratory of Microbial Structure and 
Function 
   
1985-1989 Graduate student, University of Oregon, Institute of 
 Molecular Biology 
   
1983-1984 Undergraduate Research Assistant, University of 
 Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Biochemistry 
 
INTERESTS AND EXPERTISE 
Genetics and molecular biology of prokaryotic and eukaryotic microorganisms; 
horizontal gene transfer, particularly conjugation; effects of stress, particularly 
induced by antibiotics; evolution and biosafety risk assessment; eugenics 
(historical); influence of language on science. 
 
HONORS AND SPECIAL RECOGNITION 
2018 Appointed to the Expert Working Group of the Swiss National 
Academies of Science on the topic of genetic engineering. 
2015 Recipient of the inaugural University of Canterbury Teaching Innovation 
Award 
2014 Recipient of the Tertiary Education Union National Excellence Award in 
the category of Academic Freedom 
2012- Chosen by the (United Nations) Convention on Biological Diversity 
Secretariat to serve on the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
2012 Special guest speaker University of Hohenheim Centre for Tropical 
Agriculture 30th Anniversary, Germany 
 Keynote Speaker Postgrad Research Showcase, Christchurch 
2011 Keynote Speaker, ETH Monte Verita Conference: Understanding and 
managing ecological novelty, Switzerland 
2010 Keynote Speaker, Tropentag Conference: World Food System: A 
contribution from Europe, ETH Zurich, Switzerland 
2009-2012 Chosen by the (United Nations) Convention on Biological Diversity 
Secretariat to serve on the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
2008 Chosen by the (World Bank and UN agencies) IAASTD Secretariat as 
author representative to the intergovernmental meeting on the IAASTD 
Report 
 Keynote Speaker, Feed the World Conference, London, UK 
2007 Selected by the IAASTD Advisory Bureau to serve as an author on the 
Biotechnology theme of the Synthesis Report 
2006 Appointed Lead Author in the IAASTD Global Assessment Report 
(nominated by Norway) 
2005-9 UN Roster of Experts (Biosafety Protocol) 
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 Distinguished Lecture in Microbiology, University of Wisconsin-
Madison 
2004 Speaker in the New Zealand Royal Society’s Science for Parliament 
Series 
2002 Recipient, New Zealand Association of Scientists Research Medal (The 
Association’s Research Medal is awarded each year to a single scientist 
aged under 40 for outstanding research work, principally undertaken in 
New Zealand during the three preceding years.) 
2001 Visiting Professor, Norwegian Institute for Gene Ecology and the 
University of Tromsø (with Prof. T. Traavik), Tromsø, Norway 
 Visiting Scholar, The Rockefeller University (with Nobel Laureate Prof. 
J. Lederberg), New York, USA 
1993 Young Investigator Award from the American Society for Microbiology 
Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy 
(ICAAC) [one of four awarded in an international competition] 
1989-2003 Various recognition: National Business Review Achiever of the Week (14 Feb. 2003); 
featured in Saunders, J. 2003. Multiple Drug Resistant Bacteria. Microbiology Today 
(http://www.socgenmicrobiol.org.uk/pubs/micro_today/book_reviews/MTNOV03/MTN03_24.cfm); 
featured in: Delwiche, C.F. 2000. Griffins and Chimeras: Evolution and Horizontal Gene Transfer. 
BioScience 50, 85-87; featured in: Ankenbauer, R.G. 1997. Reassessing Forty Years of Genetic 
Doctrine: Retrotransfer and Conjugation. Genetics 145, 543-549; keynote addresses, The Norwegian 
Biotechnology Advisory Board Meeting (Oslo, Norway, 1997) and International Conference on Gene 
Transfer Mediated by Bacterial Plasmids (Banff, Alberta, Canada, 1990); invited speaker, "Microbial 
Stress Response" Gordon Conference, 1994. 1989-1992 Intramural Research Training Award 
(National Institutes of Health); 1980-1989 Undergraduate and graduate school awards include: 1984, 
Outstanding Senior (final year) Student Award (University of Wisconsin-Madison Alumni 
Association); 1983, Mary Shine Peterson Award (Department of Biochemistry, University of 
Wisconsin); University of Wisconsin Forensics Team Scholarship; 1981, Phi Eta Sigma, the Freshman's 
Honor Society, MACE, the Chancellor's Men's Honor Society; 1986-1986 NIH Molecular Biology 
Predoctoral Traineeship (University of Oregon). 
GRANTS  Total value since 1995 ~NZ $4 million 
2017 UNFAO ($90,000) 
2016 Open access fee grant (US$2250) 
2015 Brian Mason Trust ($12,072). 
2014- Donations to UC Foundation for pesticide project (~$150,000) 
2013-2014 Safe Food Institute ($64,000) 
2010-2012 Marsden Fund (Primary Investigator) (NZ $620,000) 
2009-2012 GE Biosafety Forecast Service (NZ $492,000) 
2008 GE Biosafety Forecast Service (NZ $123,000) 
2006-07 Constructive Conversations (subcontract FRST) (NZ$35,000) 
2005-07 GE Biosafety Forecast Service (NZ $767,000) 
 University of Canterbury (NZ $30,000) 
 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report on 
Gene Flow (NZ $50,000) 
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 Erskine Fund Teaching Fellowship (NZ $20,000) 
2004 GE Biosafety Forecast Service (NZ $324,000) 
2003 GE Biosafety Forecast Service (NZ $31,000) 
2002 FRST: Postdoctoral fellowship (to RJ Weld to work in my laboratory for 
3 years) 
 OECD Fellowship (~NZ $40,000 for RJ Weld to work in Norway for 6 
months) 
 Brian Mason Trust: NZ $15,000 for research on GMOs 
2001 Miscellaneous: GENØK (US $10,000); Rockefeller University (US 
$6,000); University of Canterbury (US $3,000); US-New Zealand ISAT 
Bi-lateral Relations Grant ($3,200) 
2000 Marsden Fund (Associate Investigator) (NZ $447,000) 
 Ministry of Health (NZ $3,000) 
1999 Marsden Fund (Primary Investigator) (NZ $528,000) 
 Joint U. Canterbury/Crop & Food Res. (NZ $171,000) 
 Ministry of Health (NZ $8,000)  
1995-1998 (1998) Lotteries Health Research Grant (NZ $71,350), University of Canterbury Research 
Award (NZ $45,000); (1997) Christchurch School of Medicine Summer Studentship Award (to sponsor 
an undergraduate researcher), Don Beaven Trust Travelling Fellowship (NZ $3,000), University of 
Canterbury Research Award ($20,000); (1996) Lotteries Science Research Grant (NZ $35,000), (1995) 
University of Canterbury Research Award (NZ $25,000), University of Canterbury Equipment Award 
(NZ $90,000) 
CONSULTATIONS, SYMPOSIA and PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 
 
Spoken at over 70 international conferences (~85% at invitation), 
presented >10 keynote addresses and chaired over a dozen sessions. 
Served on the organising committees of 5 international meetings. Referee on 
occasion for Applied and Environmental Microbiology, Bioessays, 
Biology Letters Review, Current Microbiology, Drug Discovery Today, 
Environmental Biosafety Research, Environmental Microbiology and 
Environmental Microbiology Reports, Environmental Monitoring and 
Assessment, Environmental Pollution, Environmental Science and 
Technology, Environmental Sciences Europe, FEMS Microbiology, 
FEMS Microbiology Ecology, Entropy, Food and Chemical Toxicology, 
Food Chemistry, Future Virology, International Journal of 
Antimicrobial Agents, Journal of Applied Microbiology, Journal of 
Bacteriology, Journal of Organic Systems, Microbial Drug Resistance, 
Microbiological Research, Microbiology, Microbiology Indonesia, 
Microbiome, Molecular Biology and Evolution, Molecular Ecology, 
Molecular Microbiology, Nature Biotechnology, Nature Genetics, New 
Zealand Journal of Zoology, PeerJ, Pharmacological Research, Plasmid, 
Proceedings of the National Academies of Science USA (PNAS), RNA 
Biology, RNA Journal, Royal Society Proceedings B, Science, Science of 
the Total Environment, Scientific Reports, World Journal of 
Microbiology and Biotechnology, and ten granting agencies (NSF, USA; 
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FRST, Marsden, HRC and Lotteries Grants Board, Auckland Medical 
Research Foundation, New Zealand; MacQuarie, Australia; NERC and 
Wellcome Trust, UK, Alzheimer’s Foundation, Danish National Research 
Foundation, Denmark, Slovak Research and Development Agency, Slovak 
Republic, Beef Cattle Research Council, Canada). Chief organiser of the 
1999 International Osmoregulation Conference, Christchurch, New Zealand 
and the 2009 Hazard ID and Risk Assessment of (Trans)gene Flow, Tromsø, 
Norway. Organiser and Instructor of two prominent international courses: 
School of Bioinformatics and Genomics Summer Course in Phylogenomics 
(2003, Sweden) and International Biosafety Course (2003-continuing, 
Norway). 
2018 Invited speaker, Catchments Otago, Dunedin 
 Invited speaker, New Zealand Institute of Medical Laboratory Science 
meeting, Christchurch 
 Invited Speaker, One Health Aotearoa Symposium, Wellington 
 
2017 Invited speaker, Massey University at Albany 
 Invited speaker, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
Antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistance in horticulture Rome 
 Invited speaker, European Parliament Scientific, human health, 
husbandry, and socio-economic aspects of antibacterial resistance: time 
to act Brussels 
2016 Invited speaker: New Zealand Institute of Food Science & Technology, 
Rotorua 
2015 Graduating Year Review of Massey University’s Bachelor of Natural 
Sciences 
 Invited speaker, New Zealand Association of Scientists conference Going 
Public: Scientists speaking out on difficult issues Wellington 
 Invited speaker, University of Otago Christchurch School of Medicine 
Antibiotic resistance by stealth Christchurch 
2014 Invited speaker Lincoln University 
 Invited speaker, Miriam College, Quezon City, Philippines 
2013 Invited speaker, Understanding Biosafety: Regulation of Genetic 
Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms in Agriculture, 
Hyderabad, India 
 Invited speaker, Safety Issues in Application of Food- and Biological 
Technologies, Kunming, China 
 Invited speaker, UC Teaching Week, Christchurch 
 Professorial promotions referee, University of California Santa Barbara 
2012 Master of Ceremonies International Scientific Conference Can GM Crops 
Meet India’s Food Security and Export Markets?, New Delhi 
 Invited Speaker, Can GM crops meet India’s food security and export 
markets?, Hyderabad, India 
 Invited Speaker, GMO Risk Assessment, Independent Biosafety Research 
and Holistic Analysis, Hyderabad, India 
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 Invited Speaker, Meeting of the Parties (MOP6) side event 1: talk titled 
“AHTEG on risk assessment and risk management Process and 
Outcome”, Hyderabad, India 
 Invited Speaker, MOP6 side event 2: talk titled “Horizontal Gene Transfer 
Field Trials”, Hyderabad, India 
 Invited Speaker, Regional and Stakeholder Forum on Genetic 
Modification, Hastings, New Zealand 
2011 Editorial Board of DNA and Cell Biology 
(http://www.liebertpub.com/products/product.aspx?pid=13) 
2010 Invited Speaker, Advancing the Understanding of Biosafety Conference, 
Nagoya, Japan 
 Invited Speaker, Third World Network Side Event at the 5th Meeting of 
the Parties of the Cartagena Protocol, Nagoya, Japan 
2009 Invited Speaker Food Markets and Society II: National Symposium on 
Future Food Technologies, Auckland, New Zealand 
 Invited speaker: Evolution: the experience, Melbourne, Australia 
2008 Expert witness to Tasmanian Joint Select Committee on Gene Technology 
in Primary Industries (nominated by Hon David Llewellyn, Chair) 
2006 Invited speaker, International Biosafety Symposium Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP3) of the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, Curitiba, Brazil 
 Expert reviewer, Denmark Centre of Excellence Programme.  
2005 Expert reviewer on New Zealand Environmental Risk Management 
Authority’s policy paper: Horizontal Gene Transfer  
 Keynote Speaker, UNEP/GEF National Biosafety Framework Initiative, 
Dominican Republic 
2004 Invited speaker, International Biosafety Symposium Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP1) of the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
 Invited speaker, School of Bioinformatics and Genomics Summer Course 
in Phylogenomics, Göteborg University, Sweden 
2004-2005 Executive Committee, United Nations Environment Programme and 
GENØK Biosafety Capacity Building Partnership 
2003 Scientific consultant to the New Zealand Parliamentary Local 
Government and Environment Select Committee on “Corngate”. 
 Invited Speaker, American Society for Microbiology ICAAC conference. 
2002 Speaker: ERMANZ conference on Horizontal Gene Transfer 
 Microbial Genetics Conference, Bergen, Norway 
 New Zealand Microbiology Society Meeting 
2001 Advisor to New Zealand Minister of Science in the “Horizontal Gene 
Transfer Round Table Meeting” 
2000 Expert panel New Zealand Ministry of Health 
 New Zealand PGSF Biotechnology Tender Panel 
 University of Canterbury Representative to the NZ Royal Commission on 
Genetic Engineering 
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1999 Expert Panel on Antibiotic Residues for the New Zealand Ministry of 
Health 
1997 Keynote speaker, The Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board 
Meeting, Oslo, Norway 
1993 Advisor to the United States Department of Energy, under the auspices of 
the American Academy of Microbiology, for genetic modification of 
bacteria 
2002-2004 Editorial Board of Targets (Elsevier “Trends” series journal); 1999-2004 
Editorial Board of Drug Discovery Today (Elsevier “Trends” series). 
POSTGRADUATE TEACHING (1995-present) 
 
Experience: Primary supervisor of 13 completed MSc theses, 12 BSc (Hons) 
theses and 7 PhD theses, and associate or co-supervisor for more than 20 BSc 
(Hons), MSc and PhD students since joining the University of Canterbury 
(1994). My research laboratory presently has 3 PhD and 1 MSc student and 1 
postdoctoral scholar. 
 
Achievements: My research students received 5 of the 6 poster awards in the 
1996 Queenstown International Molecular Biology Meeting attended by 
researchers from all over the world and uniformly represented by New 
Zealand and Australian universities. Joanne Kingsbury and Tim Cooper, 
while PhD students in my laboratory, won the first and second prizes, 
respectively, for best research talks at the 1998 national meeting of the 
Microbiology and Biochemical Societies of New Zealand. Tim was a 
postdoctoral scholar at Michigan State University and is now at Auckland 
University. Joanne is a postdoctoral scholar at Duke University. Tim was 
subsequently nominated for the American Society of Microbiology Sternberg 
Thesis Award. Gayle Ferguson, another of my PhD students, won first prize 
for her talk at the Microbiology Society national meeting in 2001 and was a 
postdoctoral scholar at Columbia University, New York. 
 
EXTERNAL TEACHING ACTIVITIES 
2014 Faculty and textbook developer for Government of Swaziland short 
professional course on Biosafety (under contract to Third World 
Network) 
 
2009 Faculty and Coordinator for the Gateways Partners Symposia Course 
and Conference on (trans)gene Flow, Tromsø, Norway 
 
2005  Faculty and organiser of the Solomon Islands Biosafety Course 
 
2003-2011 Faculty and instructor International Biosafety Course 
 
2003-4 Principal Organiser and Instructor (2003), Göteborg University’s 
Bioinformatics summer graduate course, Sweden 
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2000-present PhD examiner: 4 x University of Malay; 5 x University of Otago; 3 x 
Massey; 2 x Lincoln; 1 x Macquarie University; 1 x Dartmouth 
University; 1 x University of Sydney, 2 x Massey University 
 MSc. examiner: 1 x Massey University, 3 x Otago University; 1 x 
Macquarie University 
 Assessor (MSc proposals): 3 x Auckland University 
  
Teaching experience during NIH (1990-1994), under- and post-graduate years 
(1980-1989): 1990-1994 Supervisor, NIH Summer Student Program, Rocky 
Mountain Laboratories, USA (resulting in a research paper in the journal Genetics 
by an undergraduate student in 1996); 1992-2000, University of Montana USA 
affiliate faculty; Guest lecturer, University of Montana, 1992-1994 "Advanced 
Topics in Microbiology", (course 595) University of Montana, Department of 
Biology; Teaching Assistant for Core Biology Lecture and Laboratory, Department 
of Biology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA; Presenter, Special Project 
Course in Bioethics, Department of Botany, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 
USA. 
 
STAFF LEADERSHIP ROLES 
Serving the University of Canterbury on 13 ad hoc committees in addition to 
standing committees (listed below): chair of the Academic Board Working 
Party on Space Allocation Policy (2016); chair of the College of Science 
Biosecurity Programme Committee (2004); Science Faculty Working 
Committee evaluating proposals for establishing a Department of 
Biochemistry (1995-6); the AUS Workloads Committee (1996); lead 
workshops at the Canterbury-hosted Education Forum (1999); and served on 
the AAC Subcommittee on Appeals Procedures (2000). Presentation to New 
Zealand Academic Quality Agency for UC audit 2014. Since 1995, I have 
served on 7 and chaired an additional 6 Search Committees (total of 13) for 
new academics. Participating in the staff mentorship and buddy programme. 
 
2018 Chair, UC Learning and Teaching Committee sub-committee on revision 
of the UC “Academic Freedom Policy” 
2017 Chair, School of Biological Sciences Professorial Progressions 
Committee 
Appointment committee for new position in biochemistry. 
2016 Appointment committee for new position in microbiology. 
2015-2017 Elected University Academic Representative to the Council of the 
Tertiary Education Union 
 Acting Head of School (ad hoc) 
 Appointed to the Board of the New Zealand Academic Qualifications 
Authority 
2013-16 President, Tertiary Education Union (TEU) Canterbury Branch 
2014- Chair, School of Biological Sciences Teaching and Learning Committee 
 Executive Committee, School of Biological Sciences 
 College of Science Strategic Academic Advisory Committee 
2013-  Co-chair Academic Freedom Aotearoa 
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2013  Acting Chair, Teaching and Learning Committee of the School of 
Biological Sciences 
Observer, UC Promotions Round Associate Professor and Professor 
2009 UC Academic Audit Working Group on the role of critic and conscience 
of society 
2007-2008 President, Association of University Staff (AUS) Canterbury Branch 
2006-2007 Canterbury representative AUS National Council 
2006 AUS National Bargaining Team 
2005-2006 Academic Representative (elected) on the Canterbury Branch AUS 
2005-2006 School of Biological Sciences Research Committee 
2002-2003 Chair, University Institutional Biosafety Committee 
2001-2003 Departmental Supervisor of Postgraduate Studies 
2002 University Teaching and Learning Committee 
2000-2001 Department HSNO-Biology Officer and University representative to the 
HSNO Consultative Group 
2002-2004 Department Safety Committee 
1996-2005 Chair (2000), University Joint Academic Student Grievance Committee 
1998-2001 Plant and Microbial Sciences Workload Committee 
1996-1998 Branch Committee of the Association of University Staff (AUS) 
1994-1998 Plant and Microbial Sciences Curriculum Committee 
1994-1998 Academic Supervisor of the Graduate Seminar Series 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
1989-continuing American Society for Microbiology 
1994-continuing New Zealand Microbiology Society 
1995-2002  New Zealand Molecular Biology Society 
1998-continuing New Zealand Society for Biochemistry and Molecular 
Biology 
2002-2004  New Zealand Association of Scientists 
2015-   New Zealand Association of Scientists 
2014-   Australian Society for Antimicrobials 
2014-   Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics 
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2018: Chemistry World (https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/antibiotic-analogue-
puts-researchers-on-path-to-ending-herbicide-drought/3008660.article) 15.02.18; Jack 
Heinemann Interview (by Steven Galbraith, professor of Mathematics Auckland 
University). New Zealand Skeptics Journal. Water standards ‘need tightening’ after 
antibiotic-resistant E coli found in Christchurch’s Avon River 
(https://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/104822894/water-standards-need-tightening-
after-antibioticresistant-e-coli-found-in-christchurchs-avon-river) 19.06.18. 
2017: Epoch Times (Israel) http://www.epochtimes.co.il/ October 2017; TVNZ One News 
https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/nz-study-reveals-herbicides-role-in-superbugs-could-
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have-global-significance 18.11.17. Radio New Zealand 
https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/344195/weedkiller-chemicals-linked-to-antibiotic-resistance 
19.11.17. Morning Report Radio New Zealand 20.11.17. Newsroom 
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/11/20/62213/scientist-challenges-epa-over-antibiotic-
resistance?platform=hootsuite 21.11.17. Farmers Weekly Herbicide risk to resistance linked 4.12.17. 
2016: Doubts About the Promised Bounty of Genetically Modified Crops. New York Times (by 
Pulitzer Prize journalist Danny Hakim) 29.10.2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/30/business/gmo-
promise-falls-short.html?rref=collection/byline/danny-
hakim&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=la
test&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection&_r=0 also appearing inter alia in Seattle Times (USA) 
and Houston Chronicle (USA); Nobel laureates criticise Greenpeace’s GM stance. Radio New Zealand 
2.07.16 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/307786/nobel-laureates-criticise-greenpeace's-gm-
stance; Where science ends and the GMO debate really begins. Epoch Times 22.08.2016 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2138956-where-science-ends-and-the-gmo-debate-really-begins/ 
2015: What Do We Really Know About Roundup Weed Killer? National Geographic 23.04.15 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/150422-glyphosate-roundup-herbicide-weeds/; Scientists 
keep quiet on controversial subjects fearing backlash from peers. nzDoctor 15.04.15 
http://www.nzdoctor.co.nz/news/2015/april-2015/14/scientists-keep-quiet-on-controversial-subjects-
fearing-backlash-from-peers.aspx; Common pesticides linked to antibiotic resistance. Guardian 24.3.15 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/mar/24/pesticides-antibiotic-resistance-study; Study 
links widely used pesticides to antibiotic resistance. Civil Eats 24.3.15 
http://civileats.com/2015/03/24/study-links-widely-used-pesticides-to-antibiotic-resistance/; Popular 
weedkiller tied to antibiotic resistance. Rodale News 24.3.15 http://www.rodalenews.com/roundup-
antibiotic-resistance; Herbicides raise resistance to medical antibiotics. Times of India 24.3.15 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/life-style/health-fitness/health/Herbicides-raise-resistance-to-
medical-antibiotics/articleshow/46676730.cms; Herbicides may hurt antibiotics. Radio New Zealand 
25.3.15 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/269603/herbicides-may-hurt-antibiotics; Study Links 
Widely Used Pesticides to Antibiotic Resistance. Time Magazine 24.3.15 
http://time.com/3756870/pesticides-antibiotic-resistance/?xid=tcoshare; Est-ce que le glyphosate 
favorise la résistance aux antibiotiques? Amis del Latterre. 24.3.15 
http://www.amisdelaterre.org/Nouvel-article,1878.html; 
2014: Degrees of usefulness. New Zealand Herald 12.4.14 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11236723; How can we help feed 
the world. Waikato Times 4.11.14; Technologie n’est pas magie. Le Monde 28.10.14. 
2013: Lead Opinion: Keep the pause button on GM pressed. The Hindu 7.9.13. Genetically engineered 
foods: myths and truths. Organic NZ 1.2.13. Scientists at odds over GM fungi. NZ Farmers Weekly 
25.3.13. Lax GM rules may bite back- scientists. The Press 25.3.12. New GM technology under fire. 
New Zealand Farmers Weekly. 27.3.13. Scientist warned agency of GM danger. The Press 28.3.13. 
Claims of lax food safety regulations for GM molecules. Radio New Zealand Nine to Noon. 28.3.13.  
2012: GM crops may not resolve food crisis, scientists say. Times of India. 25.9.12. Scientist warns 
against genetically modified wheat. TV3 News. 12.9.12 http://www.3news.co.nz/Scientist-warns-
against-genetically-modified-wheat/tabid/1160/articleID/269009/Default.aspx; GM crop link to liver 
failure. New Zealand Herald, 12.9.12; GM crop could cause liver failure: scientist. The West 
Australian, 11.9.12; Scientists wary of CSIRO GM crop. The Australian, 11.9.12; The worm in Bt 
brinjal. Business Standard (India), 25.3.12; ‘Proper risk assessment a must for adopting safe biotech’ 
Times of India. 6.10.12. 
2010-2011: Bt. Brinial: Note by Ministry of Environment and Forests, The Hindu, 10.2.10, Rural 
Report Radio New Zealand, 9.05.11; AgResearch stalls "damaging" report, Dominion Post, 23.6.11; 
AgResearch tried to block report, The Press, 23.6.11; Signals of gene transfer risk "not adequately 
tested", The Press, 23.6.11; AgResearch academic in row over GE report, Southland Times, 23.6.11; 




2008: Call for Government to invest more in agricultural research, Radio New Zealand, 16.4.08. Arts 
to get the chop, The Dominion Post, 30.4.08. Executions and amputations as staff protest job cuts, 
Westport News, 29.4.08. Restructuring goes ahead, Westport News, 30.4.08. Plans for restructuring go 
ahead, Gisborne Herald, 30.4.08. Claims that GM foods are needed to avert a food crisis are rubbished, 
Radio New Zealand, 9.6.08; Claims that GM crops are needed to prevent food shortages are disputed 
by experts, Radio New Zealand, 9.6.08. 
2007: GM Corn, 30 minute interview on RNZ Nine to Noon programme 19.7.07; Discussion as to 
whether new type of genetically modified corn safe for human consumption, RNZ (Morning Report), 
7.2.07; Food safety minister asked to reject new type of genetically modified corn, RNZ (6.00am 
news), 7.2.07; Minister asked to reject GM animal feed, New Zealand Herald, 7.2.07; Lobby tries to 
halt feed imports, Marlborough Express, 7.2.07; GM maize fears raised, Bay of Plenty Times, 7.2.07; 
Food lobbyists: Govt must act fast to stop GE corn, Northern Advocate, 8.2.07; Academic research 
under pressure, Gulf News, 15.2.07; Review of approval of genetically modified corn for animal feed, 
RNZ (Checkpoint), 21.2.07 
2006: The Press (Christchurch) “Gene claims a rationale for abuse” (15 August, p. A8); ABC Science 
Online “Food Regulator Criticised over new GM corn” (4 August); Interview National Radio’s 
Morning Report (6 June on High Lysine Corn); Interview National Radio’s Checkpoint (5 June on 
Corn Food Safety); The Press (Christchurch) Heinemann, J.A. 5 May 2006 Perspectives article 
“Alarm bells over GM food approval: part 2. Featured in New Zealand Herald 24.03.06 Company 
wants stockfeed GE corn approved for people; TVNZ and TV3 interview on Frank Sin’s “gay gene”, 
6 and 10 pm news 13.03.06; Christchurch Press interview on Frank Sin’s “gay gene”. 
2004-5: Heinemann, J.A., Bungard, R. and Goven, J. Confidence in biotechnology requires greater 
commitment. 3.3.05. Otago Daily Times p. 11. Featured on Checkpoint (National RadioNZ, 
25.05.04); Speaking engagements: March Presentation to the WEA; April Palmerston North branch 
of the Royal Society; Royal Society Parliament Series; July lecturer in National Science Teachers 
Conference; September Skeptics Society Annual Conference; Presenter in Natural History New 
Zealand pilot for Discovery “Dr. Know” series. 
2003: Heinemann, J.A. 9 May 2003. Economics of GE models fail to convince. National Business 
Review p. 21. Presentation to University of the Third Age. Heinemann, J.A. 25 August 2003. Food 
chain in NZ must be protected. New Zealand Herald p. A15. 
2000-2: Heinemann, J.A. 2002. GE or not to be. NZ Listener 185, 8. Interview (April 2002), 
Morning Programme National Radio "Canterbury research wins international accolades"; and CTV 
(same topic). Invited speaker for the New Zealand Association for Impact Assessment (May 2002). 
Instructor "Marvels and Menaces of Microscopic Life" University of Canterbury Continuing 
Education Course; "Radioactive" Wellington Student Radio interview on antibiotic resistance; Talk 
on horizontal gene transfer to Canterbury Botanical Society; Featured in news article by Pockley, P. 
2000. New law threatens to undermine genetics in New Zealand. Nature 406, 8; Letter to the Editor 
of the Christchurch Press: “Genetic Engineering”; Interviewed by Paul Holmes (Auckland radio) for 
NewstalkZB (27 June); Radio New Zealand News interviews (30 June and 20 July); Featured in 4 
news articles by the Christchurch Press on genetic engineering regulations; Heinemann, J.A. June 
2000. Open letter to Helen Clark. The Best Underground Press – Critical Review (6), 9, 2; 
University of Canterbury student newspaper CANTA articles: “Why do students but not academics 
have to be world-class?” (10 May 2000) and "Teaching is as teachers do” (17 May 2000); 
Heinemann, J.A. 2000. Research hazards. New Zealand Education Review (Sept. 8, 2000, p. 9); 
Heinemann, J.A. 2000. National security risk. NZ Listener (Jul 7), 7-8; interview on horizontal gene 
transfer by CHTV (1 Nov.); interview National Programme Eureka! (Nov. 26-27, 2000); 
Heinemann, J.A. 2001. The fate of students within our hands. New Zealand Education Review (Jan. 
12, 2001, p. 7). 
Presentations to Lions, Rotary (x2), WEA, University of the Third Age. 
1999: Talk on Genetically Modified Food to the Canterbury WEA; Talk on Genetically Modified 
Food to the Probus Club; Article to University of Canterbury public relations magazine, Canterbury 
Research, entitled: Are all Genes made of DNA? 
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1998: Talk on Genetically Modified Food to the WEA Bishopdale Community Centre; Article to 
community magazine, City Habitat, entitled “What is a University?”; Article to community 
magazine, City Habitat, entitled “Why You Don’t Want to be my Client”. 
1997: Interview National Programme, New Zealand Public Radio: “Superbugs”; Article to University 
of Canterbury public relations magazine, Canterbury Research, entitled: “The Life and Times of the 
Undead”; Debate Plains FM, Christchurch, New Zealand: “Risk and Ethics of Genetic Engineering”. 
1995: Interview National Programme, New Zealand Public Radio: “Antibiotic Resistance”; Advisor 
for a nationally ranked high school student science project competition. 
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Peer-Reviewed Publications (*invited)     Total: 71 
Journals (53) 
 Kurenbach, B., Gibson, P.S., Hill, A.M., Bitzer, A.S., Silby, M.W., Godsoe, W. 
and Heinemann, J.A. 2017. Herbicide ingredients change Salmonella enterica sv. 
Typhimurium and Escherichia coli antibiotic responses. Microbiology 163, 1791-
1801. 
 Coray, D.S., Wheeler, N. Heinemann, J.A. and Gardner, P.P. 2017. Why so 
narrow: distribution of anti-sense regulated, type I toxin-antitoxin systems 
compared with type II and type III systems. RNA Biology 14, 275-280. 
 Coray, D.S., Kurenbach, B. and Heinemann, J.A. 2017. Exploring the parameters 
of post segregation killing using heterologous expression of secreted toxin barnase 
and antitoxin barstar in an E. coli case study. Microbiology 163, 122–130. 
 Kurenbach, B., Marjoshi, D., Amabile-Cuevas, C.F., Ferguson, G.C., Godsoe, W., 
Gibson, P. and Heinemann, J.A. 2015. Sub-lethal exposure to commercial 
formulations of the herbicides dicamba, 2,4-D and glyphosate cause changes in 
antibiotic susceptibility in Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica serovar 
Typhimurium. Mbio 6, e00009-00015. 
 Heinemann, J.A., Agapito-Tenfen, S.Z. and Kurenbach, B. 2015. Response to “A 
28-day oral toxicity evaluation of small interfering RNAs and a long double-
stranded RNA targeting vacuolar ATPase in mice”. Regulatory Toxicology and 
Pharmacology 71, 599–600. (Quality assured by chief editor.) 
 Hilbeck, A., Rosa Binimelis, R., Defarge, N., Steinbrecher, R., Székács, A., 
Wickson, F., Antoniou, M., Bereano, P.L., Clark, E.A., Hansen, M., Novotny, E., 
Heinemann, J., Meyer, H., Shiva, V. and Wynne, B. 2015. No scientific consensus 
on GMO safety. Environmental Sciences Europe 27, 4. 
 Heinemann, J.A., Massaro, M., Coray, D. and Agapito-Tenfen, S.Z. 2014. Reply 
to comment on ‘Sustainability and innovation in staple crop production in the US 
Midwest’. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 12, 387-390. 
(Quality assured by chief editor.) 
 Heinemann, J.A., Massaro, M., Coray, D. Agapito-Tenfen, S.Z. and Wen, J.D. 
2014. Sustainability and innovation in staple crop production in the US Midwest. 
International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 12, 71-88. (Is the top 
download in the history of the journal at over 44,000 total downloads.) 
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 Hilbeck, A., Lebrecht, T., Vogel, R., Heinemann, J.A. and Binimelis, R. 2013. 
Farmer’s choice of seeds in four EU countries under different levels of GM crop 
adoption. Environmental Sciences Europe 25, 12. 
 Heinemann, J.A., Agapito-Tenfen, S.Z. and Carman, J.A. 2013. A comparative 
assessment of the regulation of GM crops containing dsRNA and suggested 
improvements to risk assessments. Environment International 55, 43-55. 
(Within one month of publication, this paper became the top download for the journal, 
surpassing the downloads of the second place paper published in 2004 and the third place 
paper published in 2011.) 
 Bigwood, T., Hudson, A.E., Cooney, J., McIntyre, L., Billington, C., Heinemann, 
J.A. and Wall, F. 2012. Inhibition of Listeria monocytogenes by Enterococcus 
mundtii isolated from soil. Food Microbiology 32, 354-360. 
 Rankin, D.J., Turner, L.A., Heinemann, J.A. and Brown, S.P. 2012. The 
coevolution of toxin and antitoxin genes drives the emergence and dynamics of 
bacterial addiction complexes as well as intragenomic conflict. Proceedings of 
the Royal Society London Biological Science Series B 279, 3706-3715. 
 Heinemann, J.A. and El-Kawy, O.A. 2012. Observational science in the 
environmental risk assessment and management of GMOs. Environment 
International 45, 68-71. 
 Romero-Suarez, S., Jordan, B. and Heinemann, J.A. 2012. Isolation and 
characteristics of phages infecting Xanthomonas campestris pv. juglandis, the 
causal agent of walnut blight disease in New Zealand. World Journal of 
Microbiology and Biotechnology 28, 1917-1927. 
 Coray, D.S., Heinemann, J.A., Tyrer, P.C. and Keenan, J.I. 2012. Human 
lactoferrin increases Helicobacter pylori internalisation into AGS cells. World 
Journal of Microbiology and Biotechnology 28, 1871-1880. 
 Bigot, B., Lee, W.-J., McIntyre, L., Wilson, T., Hudson, J.A., Billington, C. and 
Heinemann, J.A. 2011. Control of Listeria monocytogenes growth in a ready-to-
eat poultry product using a bacteriophage. Food Microbiology 28, 1448-1452. 
 Heinemann, J.A., Kurenbach, B. and Quist, D. 2011. Molecular profiling – a tool 
for addressing emerging gaps in the comparative risk assessment of GMOs. 
Environment International 37, 1285-1293. 
 Heinemann, J.A., Kurenbach, B. and Bleyendaal, N. 2011. Evaluation of 
horizontal gene transfer monitoring experiments conducted in New Zealand 
between 2004-2009. Journal of Organic Systems 6, 3-16. 
 Lee, W.-J., Billington, C., Hudson, J.A. and Heinemann, J.A. 2011. Isolation and 
characterisation of phages infecting Bacillus cereus. Letters in Applied 
Microbiology 52, 456-464. 
 Cooper, T.F., Paixão, T. and Heinemann, J.A. 2010. Within-host competition 
selects for plasmid encoded toxin-antitoxin systems. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society London Biological Science Series B 277, 3149-3155. 
 Heinemann, J.A. and Kurenbach, B. 2008. Special threats to the  
agroecosystem from the combination of genetically modified crops and  
glyphosate. Third World Network Biosafety Briefing, August 2008. 
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 Filutowicz, M., Burgess, R., Gameli, R.L., Heinemann, J.A., Kurenbach, B., 
Rakowski, S.A. and Shankar, R. 2008. Bacterial conjugation-based antimicrobial 
agents. Plasmid 60, 38-41. 
 Bigwood, T., Hudson, J.A., Billington, C., Carey-Smith, G.V. and Heinemann, 
J.A. 2008. Phage inactivation of foodborne pathogens on cooked and raw meat. 
Food Microbiology 25, 400-406. (One of the Science Direct top 25 papers for its 
publication period and category). 
 Tsuei, A.C., Carey-Smith, G.V., Hudson, J.A., Billington, C. and Heinemann, J.A. 
2007. Prevalence and numbers of coliphages and Campylobacter jejuni 
bacteriophages in New Zealand foods. International Journal of Food 
Microbiology 116, 121-125. 
Silby, M.W., Ferguson, G.C., Billington, C. and Heinemann, J.A. 2007. 
Localization of the plasmid-encoded proteins TraI and MobA in eukaryotic cells. 
Plasmid 57, 118-130. 
Willms, A.R., Roughan, P.D. and Heinemann, J.A. 2006. Static recipient cells as 
reservoirs of antibiotic resistance during antibiotic therapy. Theoretical 
Population Biology 70, 436-451. 
Heinemann, J.A., Rosén, H., Savill, M., Burgos-Caraballo, S. and Toranzos, G.A. 
2006. Environment Arrays: A possible approach for predicting changes in water-
borne bacterial disease potential. Environmental Science and Technology 40, 
7150-7156. 
Carey-Smith, G., Billington, C., Cornelius, A.J., Hudson, A. and Heinemann, J.A. 
2006. Isolation and characterization of bacteriophages infecting Salmonella spp. 
FEMS Microbiology Letters 258, 182-186. 
Roy Chowdhury, P. and Heinemann, J.A. 2006. The general secretory pathway of 
Burkholderia gladioli pv. agaricicola, BG164R, is necessary for ‘Cavity Disease’ 
in white button mushrooms. Applied and Environmental Microbiology 72, 
3558-3565. 
 Cooper, T.F. and Heinemann, J.A. 2005. Selection for plasmid postsegregational 
killing depends on multiple infection: Evidence for the selection of more virulent 
parasites through parasite-level competition. Proceedings of the Royal Society 
London Biological Science Series B 272, 403-410. 
 Heinemann, J.A. and Traavik, T. 2004. Problems in monitoring horizontal gene 
transfer in field trials of transgenic plants. Nature Biotechnology 22, 1105-1109. 
 *Heinemann, J.A., Sparrow, A.D. and Traavik, T. 2004. Is confidence in the 
monitoring of GE foods justified? Trends in Biotechnology 22, 331-336. 
(Featured on AgBiotechNet www.agbiotechnet.com) 
 Bland, M. Ismail, S., Heinemann, J.A. and Keenan, J. 2004. The action of bismuth 
against Helicobacter pylori mimics but is not caused by intracellular iron 
deprivation. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy 48, 1983–1988. 
 Weld, R.J., Butts, C. and Heinemann, J.A. 2004. Models of phage growth and 
their applicability to phage therapy. Journal Theoretical Biology 227, 1-11. 
 Ferguson, G.C., Heinemann, J.A. and Kennedy, M.A. 2002. Gene transfer 
between Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium inside epithelial cells. 
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best published in all ASM journals in April, 2002.) 
 Weld, R.J., Bicknell, R., Heinemann, J.A. and Eady, C. 2002. Ds transposition 
mediated by transient transposase expression in Heiracium aurantiacum. Plant, 
Cell, Tissue & Organ Culture 69, 45-54. 
 Heinemann, J.A. Alternative medicines: a clash of culture or science? 2001. NZ 
College Midwives Journal 24, 23-25. 
 Weld, R.J., Heinemann, J. and Eady, C. 2001. Transient GFP expression in 
Nicotiana plumbaginifolia suspension cells following co-cultivation with 
Agrobacterium tumefaciens: the role of gene silencing, cell death and T-DNA 
loss. Plant Molecular Biology 45, 377-385. 
 Cooper, T.F. and Heinemann, J.A. 2000. Postsegregational killing does not 
increase plasmid stability but acts to mediate the exclusion of competing 
plasmids. Proceedings National Academy Sciences USA 97, 12643-12648.  
 Heinemann, J.A., Ankenbauer, R.G. and Amábile-Cuevas, C.F. 2000. Do 
antibiotics maintain antibiotic resistance? Drug Discovery Today 5, 195-204. 
(Featured on Biomednet.com) 
 Cooper, T.F. and Heinemann, J.A. 2000. Transfer of conjugative plasmids and 
bacteriophage λ occurs in the presence of antibiotics that prevent de novo gene 
expression. Plasmid 43, 171-175. 
 Heinemann, J.A. 2000. The complex effects of gyrase inhibitors on bacterial 
conjugation. Journal of Biochemistry Molecular Biology & Biophysics 4, 165-
177.  
 Heinemann, J.A. 1999. Genetic evidence of protein transfer during bacterial 
conjugation. Plasmid 41, 240-247. 
 *Heinemann, J.A. 1999. How antibiotics cause antibiotic resistance. Drug 
Discovery Today 4, 72-79. (Featured on Biomednet.com) 
 Heinemann, J.A., Scott, H.E. and Williams, M. 1996. Doing the conjugative two-
step: evidence for recipient autonomy in retrotransfer. Genetics 143, 1425-1435. 
 Heinemann, J.A., Ankenbauer, R.G. and Horecka, J. 1994. Isolation of a 
conditional suppressor of leucine auxotrophy in Saccharomyces cerevisiae. 
Microbiology 140, 145-152. 
 *Heinemann, J.A. Summer, 1993. Transfer of antibiotic resistances: a novel target 
for intervention. Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics (APUA) 
Newsletter 11, 1, 6-7. 
 Heinemann, J.A. and Ankenbauer, R.G. 1993. Retrotransfer of IncP plasmid R751 
from Escherichia coli maxicells: evidence for the genetic sufficiency of self-
transferable plasmids for bacterial conjugation. Molecular Microbiology 10, 57-
62. 
 Heinemann, J.A. 1993. Bateson and peacocks' tails. Nature 363, 308. 
 Heinemann, J.A. and Ankenbauer, R.G. 1993. Retrotransfer in Escherichia coli 
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175, 583-588. 
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 *Heinemann, J.A. 1991. Genetics of gene transfer between species. Trends in 
Genetics 7, 181-185. 
 Heinemann, J.A. and Sprague, G.F., Jr. 1990. Transmission of plasmid DNA to 
yeast by conjugation with bacteria. Methods in Enzymology 194, 187-195. 
 Heinemann, J.A. and Sprague, G.F., Jr. 1989. Bacterial conjugative plasmids 
mobilize DNA transfer between bacteria and yeast. Nature 340, 205-209. 
Reports (6) 
 Heinemann, J.A. 2012. Evaluation of risks from creation of novel RNA molecules 
in genetically engineered wheat plants and recommendations for risk assessment. 
Safe Food Institute and Foundation, Melbourne, Australia. 
 AHTEG. 2010. Guidance Document on Risk Assessment of Living Modified 
Organisms. United Nations Environment Programme Convention for Biological 
Diversity (adopted by the Parties). Montreal, Canada. 
 IAASTD. 2009. Agriculture at a Crossroads: The Synthesis Report of the 
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development. Edited by B.D. McIntyre, H.R. Herren, J. Wakhungu, R.T. Watson. 
Island Press, Washington DC. 
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 *Heinemann, J.A. and Kurenbach, B. 2014. Horizontal transfer of genes between 
microorganisms. In Reference Module in Biomedical Research (M. Caplan, 
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Innovation Volume 2 (D. Gee, editor-in-chief, second edition EEA) p. 490-517. 
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microorganisms. In Encyclopedia of Microbiology (M. Schaechter, editor-in-
chief, third edition Academic Press). 
 *Heinemann, J.A. and Bungard, R.A. 2005. Horizontal Gene Transfer. In 
Encyclopedia of Molecular Cell Biology and Molecular Medicine (Meyers R.A. 
ed, second edition Wiley-VCH) p. 223-243. 
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240-257. 
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Horizontal Gene Transfer (M. Syvanen and C. Kado, eds, second edition 
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Encyclopedia of Microbiology (Joshua Lederberg, editor-in-chief, second edition 
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Horizontal Gene Transfer (M. Syvanen and C. Kado, eds, first edition London: 
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